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PERSONAL INJURY VICTIMS AS INSURANCE
COLLECTION AGENTS: ERISA PREEMPTION OF STATE
ANTISUBROGATION LAWS
Jonathan P. Connery
The Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) was
enacted in 1974 to protect the pension rights of employees
nationwide. However, due to its broad preemptive powers, ERISA
has since developed into a tool used by health insurers to recover
millions of dollars in tort damages meant to benefit employees with
ERISA health plans. This practice, known as subrogation, has been
met with legislative backlash in the form of state antisubrogation
statutes, which attempt to limit the enforceability of subrogation
clauses found in almost all ERISA health plans. However, many
courts have held that ERISA preempts these antisubrogation
statutes, thereby affirming insurers’ ability to recover funds
intended to compensate injured victims. These decisions often have
disastrous and life changing consequences for injured employees.
After examining ERISA’s preemptive clauses and the Supreme
Court cases delineating their limits, this Note argues that state
antisubrogation statutes should be upheld against preemption
challenges. This result is necessary to preserve ERISA’s original
purpose: protection of employees nationwide.
INTRODUCTION
Deborah Shank, a mother of three, sustained permanent brain
damage as the result of a car accident in 2000, relegating her to a
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wheelchair for the rest of her life.1 The health plan Shank received
as a Wal-Mart employee covered her medical bills.2 Shank filed a
lawsuit against the trucking company responsible for the accident
and was awarded a $700,000 settlement.3 After legal fees and
disbursements, Shank was left with $417,477.4 Soon after the
settlement, Wal-Mart’s health insurer commenced an action
against Shank to enforce its subrogation rights, seeking recovery of
every dollar it had paid for her medical care, which totaled
$469,216.5 Ultimately, the Eighth Circuit upheld a District Court
decision in favor of Wal-Mart and required Shank to surrender all
the money left from the settlement.6 Wal-Mart corporate
communications director Daphne Moore attempted to soften the
blow by pointing out Wal-Mart was only recovering the $417,477
left in the Shank trust and not the entire $469,216 to which it had
originally claimed a right.7 This result set off a wave of media
backlash, and, as a result of media shaming, Wal-Mart quickly
abandoned its subrogation claim and allowed Shank to keep the
money left in the trust.8 In a subsequent statement on behalf of
Wal-Mart, Daphne Moore stated: “Occasionally others help us step
back and look at a situation in a different way . . . . This is one of
those times.”9 However, while the enormous media response
resulted in a just outcome for Deborah Shank, others are not so
lucky. The far more typical case is that of Jim Ridler, who suffered
1

Admin. Comm. of the Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. Assocs.’ Health & Welfare
Plan v. Shank, 500 F.3d 834, 835 (8th Cir. 2007); Vanessa Fuhrmans, Accident
Victims Face Grab for Legal Winnings, WALL ST. J. (Nov. 20, 2007),
http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB119551952474798582.
2
Shank, 500 F.3d at 835.
3
Id.
4
Id.
5
Id.
6
Id. at 839–40.
7
Tara Parker-Pope, Injured Woman Wins Wal-Mart Saga, N.Y. TIMES:
WELL (Apr. 4, 2008), http://well.blogs.nytimes.com/2008/04/04/injured-womanwins-wal-mart-saga/ (“While Wal-Mart’s benefit plan was entitled to more than
the amount that remained in the Shank trust, the plan only recovered the funds
remaining in that trust.”); see Shank, 500 F.3d at 835 (detailing financial figures
relating to the lawsuits).
8
Parker-Pope, supra note 7.
9
Id.
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a broken neck and other injuries in 1991 when his motorcycle was
struck by a negligent driver.10 Ridler recovered $450,000,11 out of
which his health insurer took $406,000 for the medical expenses it
had paid, leaving Ridler with only $29,000 after attorneys’ fees.12
In an interview with SmartMoney Magazine, Ridler stated: “So I
pay the premium, and then when something happens that I need the
insurance for, they want their money back? . . . The way I figure it,
my health insurance is just a loan.”13 Ridler’s situation is all too
common.
Deborah Shank and John Ridler received health insurance
through benefit plans governed by the Employee Retirement
Income Security Act (ERISA).14 Congress enacted ERISA in 1974
after almost a decade of congressional investigation into the
regulation and administration of employee pension plans
nationwide.15 Congress was spurred into action by the 1963 closing
of the Studebaker automobile plant in South Bend, Indiana, which
resulted in over 4,000 employees losing some or all of their
pension plans.16 The purpose of ERISA was to protect participants
in employee benefit plans17 and achieve uniformity in the
10

See Michelle Andrews, Adding Insult to Injury, SMARTMONEY MAG.,
July 2000, at 130, 133, http://erisawithprofessorbaron.com/wp-content/uploads
/Smart-Money-Magazine-Article.pdf?phpMyAdmin=2b1c4fc8405at1c9bcde7.
11
Id.
12
Id.; see also Health & Welfare Plan for Emps. of REM, Inc. v. Ridler,
124 F.3d 207 (8th Cir. 1997).
13
Andrews, supra note 10, at 133.
14
Admin. Comm. of the Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. Assocs. Health & Welfare
Plan v. Shank, 500 F.3d 834, 835 (8th Cir. 2007); Emps. of REM, Inc., 124 F.3d
at 207.
15
Delia M. Druley, South Dakota State Medical Holding Company, Inc. v.
Hofer: A Deferential Standard of Review Permits ERISA Administrators to
Contravene Their Fiduciary Obligations, 54 S.D. L. REV. 266, 266 (2009).
16
Id. at 277 n.110; see also James A. Wooten, “The Most Glorious Story of
Failure in the Business”: The Studebaker-Packard Corporation and the Origins
of ERISA, 49 BUFF. L. REV. 683, 683–84 (2001) (“No single event is more
closely associated with ERISA than the shutdown of the Studebaker plant in
South Bend, Indiana.”).
17
29 U.S.C. § 1001(b) (1978) (“It is hereby declared to be the policy of this
chapter to protect . . . the interests of participants in employee benefit plans and
their beneficiaries . . . . ”).
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administration of such plans, which had previously been subject to
varying state laws and regulations.18 To further this goal, Congress
set certain minimum standard requirements for employee benefit
plans19 and vested ERISA with wide-ranging preemptive powers.20
Congress passed ERISA almost unanimously.21
Despite this Congressional history, ERISA has developed into
a vehicle for insurers providing health coverage to employee health
plans to pursue subrogation claims and rights of reimbursement
against the settlement funds of injured victims.22 This practice,
which all fifty states prohibited prior to ERISA,23 is now pursued
with a “terminator-like” focus and aggression by certain
employers, despite ERISA itself remaining completely silent on
the issue of subrogation in personal injury cases.24 In US Airways
v. McCutchen, the Supreme Court dealt with a fact pattern typical
to many ERISA subrogation cases.25 Plaintiff James E. McCutchen
sustained personal injuries in a car accident and later recovered a
total of $110,000 from the tortfeasor in settlement of his claim for

18

Fort Halifax Packing Co. v. Coyne, 482 U.S. 1, 9 (1987); see also
Landon Wade Magnusson, Note, Golden Gate and the Ninth Circuit’s Threat to
ERISA’s Uniformity and Jurisprudence, 2010 BYU L. REV. 167, 167 (2010)
(“[O]ne of ERISA’s primary purposes [is] uniformity.”).
19
Ingersoll-Rand Co. v. McClendon, 498 U.S. 133, 137 (1990) (citing
Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85, 91 (1983)).
20
Howard Shapiro et al., ERISA Preemption: To Infinity and Beyond and
Back Again? (A Historical Review of Supreme Court Jurisprudence), 58 LA. L.
REV. 997, 1000 (1998) (describing ERISA as containing the “broadest statutory
preemption provision to date”).
21
Druley, supra note 15, at 277.
22
Roger M. Baron & Anthony P. Lamb, The Revictimization of Personal
Injury Victims by ERISA Subrogation Claims, 45 CREIGHTON L. REV. 325, 325–
30 (2012).
23
Id. at 326.
24
Professor Baron, Radio Health Journal on ERISA Reimbursement (Mar.
19, 2011), http://erisawithprofessorbaron.com/audio-and-video/radio-health-jour
nal-episode-on-erisa-reimbursement/ (“There are certain employers who perhaps
have a terminator attitude with regard to pursuing subrogation even in the light
of some of the most atrocious circumstances.”).
25
US Airways, Inc. v. McCutchen, 133 S. Ct. 1537, 1543 (2013); see also
FMC Corp. v. Holliday, 498 U.S. 52 (1990); Sereboff v. Mid Atl. Med. Servs.,
Inc., 547 U.S. 356 (2006).
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damages.26 After attorneys’ fees, McCutchen was left with a
settlement of $66,000.27 US Airways, McCutchen’s employer, had
in place a health benefits plan which had paid out $66,866 in
medical expenses for the injuries sustained by McCutchen in the
car accident.28 US Airways demanded full reimbursement for
McCutchen’s medical expenses—the total of all remaining
settlement funds plus $866 out of his own pocket.29 The Court
summarized US Airways’ pursuit of reimbursement as requiring
McCutchen, its insured, to “pay for the privilege of serving as US
Airways’ collection agent.”30
Enforcement of subrogation and reimbursement rights in the
manner seen in McCutchen currently fuels an industry providing
billions of dollars in windfall cash recoveries to insurers.31 This
practice has been hotly contested throughout the country with
widely varying results and numerous trips to the Supreme Court.32
In August of 2014, the Second Circuit issued a decision in Wurtz v.
Rawlings concerning ERISA’s preemption of New York’s

26

McCutchen, 133 S. Ct. at 1543.
Id.
28
Id.
29
Id.
30
Id. at 1550. Ultimately, the Court ruled that the “common fund” doctrine
was a valid method of interpreting the insurance contract between McCutchen
and US Airways because the plan terms did not expressly disavow application of
that doctrine. See id. at 1549–51; see also Benjamin Garbe, In ERISA We Trust:
U.S. Supreme Court Rules that ERISA Plan Language Cannot Be Trumped by
Equitable Defenses in Fiduciary Action for Reimbursement, 9 A.B.A. HEALTH
ESOURCE (July 2013), http://www.americanbar.org/content/newsletterr/public
ations/aba_health_esource_home/aba_health_law_esource_1307_garbe.html.
Therefore, the case was remanded on the issue of whether US Airways should
have to pay a portion of the attorneys’ fees paid out of the settlement.
McCutchen, 133 S. Ct. at 1551.
31
Baron & Lamb, supra note 22, at 325.
32
Cal. Div. of Labor Standards Enf’t v. Dillingham Constr., N.A., 519 U.S.
316, 334–35 (1997) (Scalia, J. dissenting) (“[T]his Court has accepted certiorari
in, and decided, no less than 14 cases to resolve conflicts in the Courts of
Appeals regarding ERISA preemption of various sorts of state law. The rate of
acceptance, moreover, has not diminished (we have taken two more ERISA
preemption cases so far this Term), suggesting that our prior decisions have not
succeeded in bringing clarity to the law.”).
27
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antisubrogation law in which it acknowledged a conflict with
Third, Fourth, and Fifth Circuit holdings.33
While enforcement of subrogation rights provides a significant
stream of revenue for insurers, the stakes for individual personal
injury victims are even larger. Enforcement of an insurance
company’s subrogation rights can result in the loss of a significant
portion of settlement funds awarded to an injured plaintiff and can
even lead to the plaintiff losing the entire settlement.34 This can
create situations where, despite the clear liability of a defendant
and the presence of severe personal injury to the plaintiff, the
plaintiff’s case is economically untenable, both for the attorneys
involved and for the injured victim.35 Several states have
acknowledged the need to limit insurance companies in their
“terminator-like” pursuit of subrogation recoveries and have
attempted to pass antisubrogation statutes.36 Other states have
incorporated select common law doctrines in attempts to alleviate
the hardships that can arise from strict enforcement of subrogation
clauses in ERISA governed health plans.37 However, even states

33

Wurtz v. Rawlings Co., 761 F.3d 232, 243 (2d Cir. 2014).
See Admin. Comm. of the Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. Assocs.’ Health &
Welfare Plan v. Shank, 500 F.3d 834 (8th Cir. 2007) (holding that Wal-Mart
was entitled to reimbursement for the full portion of remaining settlement funds
from Shank’s personal injury settlement where Shank had sustained permanent
brain damage as a result of a car accident); see also Randi Kaye, BrainDamaged Woman at Center of Wal-Mart Suit, CNN (Mar. 25, 2008),
http://www.cnn.com/2008/US/03/25/walmart.insurance.battle/ (discussing the
circumstances surrounding Shank’s case).
35
Gregory Pitts, Comment, E.R.I.S.A. Subrogation as Interpreted Within
the Seventh Circuit - A Roadmap for Managing First Dollar Recovery, 35 J.
MARSHALL L. REV. 765, 766 (2002).
36
See Daran Kiefer, Anti-Subro Laws: Multiple States Have Proposed or
Passed Laws that Threaten Carriers’ Abilities to Subrogate, and the Trend is
Expected to Continue, CLAIMS MGMT. (May 21, 2010), http://claimsmanagement.theclm.org/home/article/anti-subro-laws (listing states with passed
or pending antisubrogation statutes); see also GARY L. WICKERT, ERISA AND
HEALTH INSURANCE SUBROGATION IN ALL 50 STATES, §§ 3.01–3.51 (5th ed.
2013) (discussing antisubrogation measures in all fifty states).
37
WICKERT, supra note 36, at §§ 3.01–3.51.
34
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that have enacted antisubrogation statutes have been thwarted by
the extensive scope of ERISA’s preemption powers.38
This Note addresses ERISA’s preemption of state
antisubrogation laws with the view that judicial overextension of
ERISA’s preemptive powers, resulting in the nullification of state
antisubrogation laws, undermines ERISA’s fundamental purpose:
to protect employees covered under employee benefit
plans.39.ERISA’s wide-ranging preemptive powers, coupled with
the statute’s silence on the issue of subrogation, has created a
“regulatory vacuum” in which health insurers dictate the scope and
enforceability of their subrogation rights while remaining largely
free from efforts of state legislatures to place limits on these
rights.40 This note asserts that state antisubrogation laws must be
upheld in the face of ERISA preemption challenges so as to protect
injured victims from the unjust result of having to surrender
significant portions of any recoveries they might gain from a thirdparty tortfeasor. When subrogation clauses are enforced through
the mechanisms of ERISA’s preemptive clauses, the statute’s
fundamental purpose is defeated.
Part I provides a brief background on health-insurer
subrogation claims and rights of recovery against settlement funds
obtained by their insured in third-party tort actions. Part II
describes ERISA’s two primary preemptive powers: express
preemption and complete preemption. In so doing, Part II focuses
on the Second Circuit’s decision in Wurtz v. Rawlings, which
38

See, e.g., Wurtz v. Rawlings Co., 933 F. Supp. 2d 480 (E.D.N.Y. 2013),
vacated and remanded, 761 F.3d 232 (2d Cir. 2014); Levine v. United
Healthcare Corp., 402 F.3d 156 (3d Cir. 2005); Arana v. Ochsner Health Plan,
338 F.3d 433 (5th Cir. 2003); Singh v. Prudential Health Care Plan, Inc., 335
F.3d 278 (4th Cir. 2003).
39
Baron & Lamb, supra note 22, at 326–27 (2012) (“It is no small irony
that Congress originally passed ERISA for the purpose of uniformly protecting
‘[t]he interests of participants in employee benefit plans and their
beneficiaries.’” (citing 29 U.S.C. § 1001(b) (2012))).
40
Aetna Health Inc. v. Davila, 542 U.S. 200, 222 (2004) (Ginsburg, J.,
concurring) (“Because the Court has coupled an encompassing interpretation of
ERISA’s preemptive force with a cramped construction of the ‘equitable relief’
allowable under § 502(a)(3), a ‘regulatory vacuum’ exists: ‘[V]irtually all state
law remedies are preempted but very few federal substitutes are provided.’”
(quoting DiFelice v. Aetna U.S. Healthcare, 346 F.3d 442, 456 (3d Cir. 2003))).
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upheld a revised New York antisubrogation statute and determined
that ERISA did not preempt the statute. This part also discusses the
conflicting decisions in the Third, Fourth, and Fifth Circuits. Part
III analyzes the policy implications for and against insurance
subrogation, with a particular focus on the rise of state
antisubrogation laws. Part IV concludes with a proposed solution
to the overextension of ERISA based subrogation enforcement,
bolstered by the Second Circuit’s decision in Wurtz. This solution
is grounded in recognition of the fundamental differences between
funds attained via third-party actions and benefits distributed in
accord with ERISA governed health plans. Courts can use this
distinction to uphold antisubrogation statutes in the face of
preemptive challenges under ERISA, ensuring that the practical
effects of ERISA conform with the statute’s original purpose: to
protect employees and their beneficiaries.41
I. SUBROGATION AND ERISA—A MISMATCHED MARRIAGE
A. Enforcement of Subrogation Claims—ERISA and
Appropriate Equitable Relief
Subrogation is defined as “[t]he substitution of one party for
another whose debt the party pays.”42 In the specific context of
personal injury litigation and health insurer subrogation,
subrogation entitles the “insurer to be substituted to the rights of
the insured and pursue recovery directly from a tortfeasor or, when
the insured recovers from the tortfeasor, to be reimbursed43 from
41

29 U.S.C. § 1001(b) (2012).
Subrogation, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).
43
Subrogation and right of reimbursement are often used interchangeably
by courts and practitioners but there is a technical difference between the two.
16 COUCH ON INSURANCE § 226:4 (3d ed. 2015). Subrogation was a remedy
historically invoked in the field of property insurance. See Brendan S. Maher &
Radha A. Pathak, Understanding and Problematizing Contractual Tort
Subrogation, 40 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 49, 54–55 (2008) (discussing history of
subrogation and distinctions between subrogation and reimbursement). “Strict
subrogation,” in the context of ERISA personal injury claims, occurs when the
insurer intervenes in or prosecutes the tort action and recovers its funds directly
from the tortfeasor. See id. Reimbursement, on the other hand, is often written
into health plans in a separate clause and purports to give the insurer the right to
42
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that recovery.”44 As the McCutchen case reveals, subrogation and
reimbursement rights allow for an insurer to recover funds against
its own insured or the third-party tortfeasor for medical funds paid
out in the event of a settlement or judgment against the tortfeasor.45
The following hypothetical illustrates the drastic effect of
subrogation claims in the personal injury context: a pedestrian is
severely injured in a car accident and incurs medical expenses
exceeding $100,000, all of which are covered by the victim’s
employee health benefit plan.46 The third-party tortfeasor has a
$100,000 insurance policy.47 The health plan then takes this entire
settlement “pursuant to its own right of subrogation,” and leaves
the victim with nothing.48
ERISA itself does not mention a right of subrogation.49 Instead,
insurers have used the enforcement mechanism and preemption
clause under ERISA to establish a super-contractual right50 to
include enforceable subrogation and reimbursement clauses in
their insurance contracts.51 Courts have routinely held that the
collect its portion of settlement funds directly from its own insured after the
insured has settled his or her claim against the tortfeasor. See id. Both practices
aim to achieve the same result: recoupment of funds the insurer paid for the
insured’s medical bills from a settlement with the third-party tortfeasor. See id.
This Note will use the term “subrogation” to encompass both strict subrogation
and right of reimbursement claims.
44
COUCH ON INSURANCE, supra note 43, at § 222:5 n.26 (emphasis added)
(citing Paulsen v. Dep’t of Soc. & Health Servs., 898 P.2d 353 (Wash. Ct. App.
1995)).
45
See US Airways, Inc. v. McCutchen, 133 S. Ct. 1537, 1542–43 (2013).
46
Pitts, supra note 35, at 765.
47
Id.
48
Id. at 766.
49
Id. at 772.
50
Maher & Pathak, supra note 43, at 72–76 (discussing development of
subrogation as contractual right); see also Roger M. Baron, Public Policy
Considerations Warranting Denial of Reimbursement to ERISA Plans: It’s Time
to Recognize the Elephant in the Courtroom, 55 MERCER L. REV. 595, 616
(2004) (“This argument, articulated in the first person of the ERISA plans
themselves, could be stated as follows: ‘We have given ourselves the right to
reimbursement and it should be enforced without question.’ Reduced to basic
terms, the argument is simply, ‘Because we say so.’”).
51
Pitts, supra note 35, at 772 (“Congress specifically prescribed for
fiduciary plan provisions to ‘supersede any and all State laws’ that ‘relate to any
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terms of ERISA plans must be strictly enforced.52 Furthermore,
ERISA § 502(a) includes an enforcement mechanism that allows
plan fiduciaries to seek “appropriate equitable relief.”53 The
Supreme Court has held that subrogation clauses are enforceable as
appropriate equitable relief under ERISA, subject to some
technical requirements.54 Beneficiaries challenging the subrogation
clauses in their health plans often cannot utilize state
antisubrogation laws and common law doctrines due to ERISA’s
broad preemptive powers.55 This allows insurers to create

employee benefit plan.’ . . . [T]this provision is regularly interpreted to allow
fiduciary plans to maintain first dollar priority over recoveries made by injured
participants . . . . ERISA plans are given free reign to incorporate strong
subrogation provisions into the plan language, which state laws cannot
circumvent.” (footnote omitted) (quoting 29. U.S.C. § 1444(a) (2000))).
52
Kennedy v. Conn. Gen. Life Ins. Co., 924 F.2d 698, 700 (7th Cir. 1991)
(“ERISA instructs courts to enforce strictly the terms of plans . . . .”).
53
29 U.S.C. § 1132(a) (2012).
54
The Supreme Court addressed the enforceability of subrogation clauses
in Great-West v. Knudson and Sereboff v. Mid-Atlantic. Great-W. Life &
Annuity Ins. Co. v. Knudson, 534 U.S. 204 (2002); Sereboff v. Mid Atl. Med.
Servs., Inc., 547 U.S. 356 (2006). Sereboff established that reimbursement
clauses were enforceable as “appropriate equitable relief” under ERISA so long
as the insurer sought to recover from funds which were actually in the
possession of the insured. Sereboff, 547 U.S. at 361–69. This clarified confusion
arising after the decision in Knudson. Knudson held that an insurer attempting to
enforce its reimbursement clause was not seeking “appropriate equitable relief”
under ERISA because the settlement funds the insurer pursued were not actually
in the possession of the insured, but had already been placed into a special needs
trust for the care of Knudson who had been rendered a quadriplegic as a result of
a car accident. Knudson, 534 U.S. at 207, 221. Essentially, the reimbursement
claim was not enforceable in Knudson only because the insurer was “outmaneuvered” once the settlement funds were placed into a special needs trust
instead of being taken into possession directly by its insured. This would come
to be known as the “possession theory” and insurers simply revised their
collection practices to fall into line with this technical requirement. Sereboff:
ERISA Subrogation Regains Life After Great-West, THOMPSON HINE,
http://benefitslink.com /articles/sereboff_thompson_hine.pdf (last visited Sept.
11, 2015).
55
See Sereboff, 547 U.S. at 368; see also Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux,
481 U.S. 41, 46 (1987) (“[ERISA’s] preemptive scope was as broad as its
language.”).
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enforceable subrogation terms in their ERISA plans despite several
states’ legislative efforts to limit or bar subrogation entirely.56
On the surface, the connection between ERISA and insurance
subrogation rights is difficult to identify.57 ERISA’s enforcement
mechanism is detailed in ERISA § 502(a), 29 U.S.C. § 1132,
which states, in relevant part, as follows:
A civil action may be brought—. . .
(3) by a participant, beneficiary, or fiduciary (A) to
enjoin any act or practice which violates any
provision of this subchapter or the terms of the plan,
or (B) to obtain other appropriate equitable relief
(i) to redress such violations or (ii) to enforce any
provisions of this subchapter or the terms of the
plan[.]58
Subrogation as equitable relief was expressly affirmed in Sereboff
v. Mid Atl. Med. Servs., Inc., in which the Supreme Court held that
appropriate equitable relief under § 502(a) included “plans’ rights
to enforce reimbursement and subrogation provisions . . . even
when state-law equitable defenses purport to limit such rights.”59
ERISA does not expressly provide for an insurer’s right of
subrogation against its insured.60 Rather, under Sereboff, the
56

Caroline Wrenn Cleveland, ERISA Preemption: As the Federal Courts
Identify the Outer Boundaries of ERISA’s Preemption Clause, What are the
Implications for South Carolina State Actions?, 42 S.C.L. REV. 743, 748 (1991)
(“[ERISA’s preemption clause] has swept away conflicting state actions.”).
57
See Arnold Levinson, The Tragedies of ERISA’s Unintended Preemption
of State Law Remedies, PILLSBURY & COLEMAN, LLP, http://www.pillsbury
coleman.com/News/Published-Works/The-Tragedies-of-ERISA.pdf, (last visited
Sept. 11, 2015) (“Both the language of ERISA and its extensive legislative
history show that this result was never intended by ERISA’s drafters. There is
not a single sentence in the legislative history that would suggest an intent for
such a dramatic reordering of the rights of insured and insurance companies.”).
58
29 U.S.C. § 1132(a) (2012).
59
Brief for Defendants-Appellees the Rawlings Co., Oxford Health Plans
(NY), Inc. and UnitedHealth Group Inc., Wurtz v. Rawlings Co., 761 F.3d 232
(2d Cir. 2014) (No. 13-1695-cv), 2013 WL 3964707, at *7–8 (first citing
Sereboff, 547 U.S. at 361–65; and then citing U.S. Airways Inc. v. McCutchen,
133 S. Ct. 1537, 1546–48 (2013)).
60
Ashley Aunita Prebula Frazier, ERISA Subrogation and the Controversy
over Sereboff: Silencing the Critics, the Divided Bench Is a Legitimate
Standard, 45 GA. L. REV. 579, 594–95 (2011) (“ERISA does not contain a
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ERISA plan between the insurer and the insured functions as an
equitable contract and the subrogation clauses found in the plan
establish a “constructive trust” or “equitable lien” over a portion of
any settlement funds the insured may receive as a result of a tort
action against a third-party.61 The Supreme Court analogized this
constructive trust with the facts in Barnes v. Alexander, in which
attorney Barnes promised two other attorneys a portion of the
contingency fee in a particular case if and when the case
succeeded.62 This analogy illustrated that, as in subrogation claims
in the personal injury context, it is not necessary that the money or
the funds actually be in existence at the time the “equitable
contract” is formed (the moment when the employee agrees to be
covered under the terms of the health benefit plan), but only that an
agreement exists between the two parties as to how the funds will
be divided in the event of a settlement.63 These subrogation clauses
are often uniform clauses contained in standard form plans64 and in
many cases the insured does not contest the presence or specificity
of the subrogation clause itself. Rather, an insured seeking to avoid
the loss of settlement funds to a subrogation claim must rely on
state antisubrogation statutes or common law doctrines that aim to
mitigate the effect of the subrogation clauses.65
B. ERISA’s Preemptive Powers
Scholars and courts have both described ERISA as containing
the broadest preemptive power of any federal statute.66 The
statutory provision explicitly permitting, prohibiting, or controlling subrogation,
or allowing for a right of reimbursement.”).
61
Sereboff, 547 U.S. 356, 362–63.
62
Id. at 357 (citing Barnes v. Alexander, 232 U.S. 117, 34 (1914)).
63
Id.
64
WICKERT, supra note 36, at § 12-1 (providing sample subrogation and
reimbursement clauses to be used in ERISA plans).
65
Id. at §§ 3.1–3.51 (discussing antisubrogation measures in all fifty
states); see also Sereboff, 547 U.S. at 368 (holding plaintiffs did not have access
to equitable defenses against subrogation claim, such as the “make whole”
doctrine where terms of the plan expressly disavowed these defenses).
66
Shapiro, supra note 20, at 1000 (describing ERISA as containing the
“broadest statutory preemption provision to date”); Pilot Life Ins. Co. v.
Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41, 46 (1987) (“The House and Senate sponsors emphasized
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purpose of ERISA’s preemptive power was to ensure minimum
standards of protection for employees under their health benefit
plans.67 ERISA’s broad preemptive power has allowed insurers to
control the terms of their contracts with immunity from state
legislative decisions as to whether those terms should or should not
be enforceable.68 This has led to an untenable gap in which
“[v]irtually all state law remedies are preempted but very few
federal substitutes are provided,” leading to a tremendous amount
of insurer discretion in the structuring of qualified ERISA
insurance plans.69 Furthermore, the muddled and seemingly
contradictory language of ERISA’s preemptive powers has created
a “web of ERISA confusion.”70 The Supreme Court has derided
ERISA’s preemptive clauses, stating that they are “not a model of
legislative drafting.”71 Due to the confusion arising from these
particular clauses, methods of interpreting ERISA’s preemptive
powers are constantly shifting, with no clear consensus in sight.72
both the breadth and importance of the preemption provisions. Representative
Dent described the ‘reservation to Federal authority [of] the sole power to
regulate the field of employee benefit plans’ as ERISA’s ‘crowning
achievement.’” (quoting 120 CONG. REC. 29197 (daily ed. Aug. 20, 1974)
(statement of Rep. Dent))).
67
29 U.S.C. § 1001(b) (2012).
68
Baron, supra note 50, at 616; WICKERT, supra note 36, at 5-14 (“The
main reason that subrogating plans have a stronger position under ERISA than
they have under state laws is that many state law ‘Antisubrogation’ Doctrines
and common law defenses are preempted.”).
69
Aetna Health Inc. v. Davila, 542 U.S. 200, 222 (2004) (Ginsburg, J.,
concurring) (quoting DiFelice v. Aetna U.S. Healthcare, 346 F.3d 442, 456–57
(3d Cir. 2003) (Becker, J., concurring)).
70
Murzyn v. Amoco Corp., 925 F. Supp. 594, 601 (N.D. Ind. 1995).
71
Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts, 471 U.S. 724, 739–40 (1985)
(“[W]hile the general preemption clause broadly preempts state law, the saving
clause appears broadly to preserve the States’ lawmaking power over much of
the same regulation. While Congress occasionally decides to return to the States
what it has previously taken away, it does not normally do both at the same
time.”). This Note recognizes one of the fundamental incongruities of the
express preemption and savings clauses. Where the preemption clause aims to
broadly strip states’ legislative powers, the savings clause broadly attempts to
give it back. Id.
72
See Karla S. Bartholomew, ERISA Preemption of Medical Malpractice
Claims in Managed Care: Asserting a New Statutory Interpretation, 52 VAND.
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ERISA contains two separate methods of preemption: express
preemption under ERISA § 514(a), 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a),73
(sometimes referred to as conflict preemption) and complete
preemption under § 502(a).74 The Supreme Court established the
current approach to express preemption under § 514 in Kentucky
Assn’ of Health Plans v. Miller. The Court outlined complete
preemption under § 502(a) in Kentucky Assn’ of Health Plans v.
Miller and Aetna Health Inc. v. Davila.75
C. Express Preemption Under ERISA § 514
ERISA § 514, 29 U.S.C. § 1144, contains three interrelated
clauses referred to as the express preemption clause, the savings
clause, and the deemer clause. The express preemption clause
states as follows:
a) Supersedure; effective date
Except as provided in subsection (b) of this section,
the provisions of this subchapter and subchapter III
of this chapter shall supersede any and all State
laws insofar as they may now or hereafter relate to
any employee benefit plan described in section
1003(a) of this title and not exempt under section
1003(b) of this title. This section shall take effect on
January 1, 1975 . . . .76
The savings clause states as follows:
(2)(A) Except as provided in subparagraph (B),
nothing in this subchapter shall be construed to
L. REV. 1131, 1133 (1999) (“The Supreme Court’s tortured attempts to give
effect to the statutory language have led to doctrinal confusion and ‘chaos’ in
the lower courts. Little judicial guidance, therefore, currently exists for
interpreting ERISA’s poorly constructed preemption clause.” (quoting Catherine
L. Fisk, The Last Article About the Language of ERISA Preemption? A Case
Study of the Failure of Textualism, 33 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 35, 78 (1996))).
73
29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (2012).
74
29 U.S.C. § 1132(a) (2012).
75
Aetna Health Inc. v. Davila, 542 U.S. 200 (2004); Ky. Ass’n of Health
Plans, Inc. v. Miller, 538 U.S. 329 (2003).
76
29 U.S.C. § 1144(a)(2012).

ERISA AND STATE ANTISUBROGATION LAWS

145

exempt or relieve any person from any law of any
State which regulates insurance, banking, or
securities.77
The third and final clause critical to subrogation analysis under
ERISA is the deemer clause which states as follows:
(B) Neither an employee benefit plan described in
section 1003(a) of this title, which is not exempt
under section 1003(b) of this title (other than a plan
established primarily for the purpose of providing
death benefits), nor any trust established under such
a plan, shall be deemed to be an insurance company
or other insurer, bank, trust company, or investment
company or to be engaged in the business of
insurance or banking for purposes of any law of any
State purporting to regulate insurance companies,
insurance contracts, banks, trust companies, or
investment companies.78
ERISA’s express preemption clause is notable for its
exceptions. Under the savings clause, state laws that “regulate
insurance, banking or securities”79 are saved from preemption.80
77

29 U.S.C. § 1144(b)(2)(A)(2012).
29 U.S.C. § 1144(a)-1144(b)(B)(2012). Self-funded plans are not
“saved” from preemption due to the deemer clause, therefore any
antisubrogation regulations by a state will always be preempted from application
to self-funded plans. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 471 U.S. at 747 (“We are aware that
our decision results in a distinction between insured and uninsured plans,
leaving the former open to indirect regulation while the latter are not.”). The
difference between self-funded plans and fully-insured plans is straightforward.
Employers that create self-funded plans collect premiums and then establish a
fund to satisfy any claims or to pay for medical benefits directly. Troy Paredes,
Stop-Loss Insurance, State Regulation, and ERISA: Defining the Scope of
Federal Preemption, 34 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 233, 234 (1997). Fully-insured
plans are plans in which the employer purchases insurance for its plan
participants from a third-party insurer. Id. This note focuses exclusively on
fully-insured plans so the deemer clause is irrelevant for this analysis.
79
29 U.S.C. § 1144(a)(2012).
80
Metro. Life Ins. Co., 471 U.S. at 740 (“[T]he savings clause appears
broadly to preserve the States’ lawmaking power . . . .”).
78
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The deemer clause holds that self-funded ERISA plans cannot be
deemed to be insurers and therefore cannot be saved from
preemption.81 The Supreme Court provided the most succinct
explanation of § 514’s “mechanics” in Pilot Life v. Dedeaux: “If a
state law ‘relate[s] to . . . employee benefit plan[s],’ it is
preempted. The savings clause excepts from the preemption clause
laws that ‘regulat[e] insurance.’”82 This savings clause was
intended to preserve the states’ traditional ability to regulate
insurance.83 However, the statute itself does not provide any
guidance on interpreting the savings clause and the question of
which state laws regulate insurance has been contentiously
litigated, with widely varying results.84 The interaction between
ERISA’s wide preemption clause purporting to “supersede any and
all state laws . . . relat[ing] to any employee benefit plans” and the
equally wide savings clause protecting state regulation of insurance
has been repeatedly criticized by the Supreme Court as selfcontradictory85 and the Court has invited Congress to consider

81

FMC Corp. v. Holliday, 498 U.S. 52, 61 (1990).
Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41, 45 (1987) (alteration in
original) (citation omitted) (quoting ERISA § 514(a)-(b)(2)(A)).
83
Rush Prudential HMO, Inc. v. Moran, 536 U.S. 355, 387 (2002)
(“‘[S]tate laws regulating the substantive terms of insurance contracts were
commonplace well before the mid-70’s’[]. It is therefore hard to imagine a
reservation of state power to regulate insurance that would not be meant to cover
restrictions of the insurer’s advantage . . . .” (alteration in original) (quoting
Metro. Life Ins. Co., 471 U.S. at 742)); Matthew G. Vansuch, Not Just Old Wine
in New Bottles: Kentucky Ass’n of Health Plans, Inc. v. Miller Bottles A New
Test for State Regulation of Insurance, 38 AKRON L. REV. 253, 264–65 (2005)
(“Consistent with McCarran-Ferguson’s preference for state regulation of
insurance and the premise that insurance is not its focus, ERISA ‘saves’ state
laws that regulate insurance from preemption. ‘State law’ has been broadly
interpreted, in accordance with ERISA’s sweeping definition.”).
84
See Donald T. Bogan, ERISA: The Savings Clause, § 502 Implied
Preemption, Complete Preemption, and State Law Remedies, 42 SANTA CLARA
L. REV. 105, 108–09 (2001) (“ERISA’s preemption language has become the
bane of practitioners and the courts. The Supreme Court has issued no fewer
than eighteen opinions dealing with ERISA preemption . . . .”).
85
Metro. Life Ins. Co., 471 U.S. at 739–40 (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a)
(2012)).
82
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rewriting the express preemption clause.86 The Second and Fourth
Circuit Courts of Appeals are the only two circuits to have directly
addressed the issue of express preemption of antisubrogation
statutes as applied to insured health plans.87 Both courts cited the
Supreme Court’s holding in FMC Corp. v. Holliday and held that
state antisubrogation statutes, when applied to insured health plans,
are saved from preemption under the savings clause.88
D. The Savings Clause—State Regulation of Insurance
In 2003, the Supreme Court acknowledged that its savings
clause holdings had “misdirected attention” and “failed to provide
clear guidance to lower federal courts.”89 The Court displaced its
prior analysis for a new, simplified approach in Kentucky Ass’n v.
Miller.90 Miller outlined the current test for determining which
laws “regulate insurance” and are therefore saved from ERISA
preemption.91 The test laid out two requirements under the savings
clause: 1) the state law in question must be “specifically directed
toward”92 insurance and 2) the state law must “affect the risk
pooling arrangement between the insurer and the insured.”93

86

Aetna Health Inc. v. Davila, 542 U.S. 200, 222–23 (2004) (Ginsburg, J.
dissenting) (“I also join the rising judicial chorus urging that Congress and [this]
Court revisit what is an unjust and increasingly tangled ERISA regime.”
(quoting DiFelice v. Aetna U.S. Healthcare, 346 F.3d 442, 453 (3d Cir. 2003)
(Becker, J., concurring))).
87
Wurtz v. Rawlings Co., 761 F.3d 232, 240–41 (2d Cir. 2014); Singh v.
Prudential Health Care Plan, Inc., 335 F.3d 278, 286 (4th Cir. 2003).
88
Wurtz, 761 F.3d at 240; Singh, 335 F.3d at 286.
89
Ky. Ass’n of Health Plans, Inc. v. Miller, 538 U.S. 329, 339–40 (2003).
90
Id. at 334–42.
91
Id.; Vansuch, supra note 83, at 256 (“Miller clarified the savings clause
analysis by establishing a broad, two-step test for determining if a state law
regulates insurance.”).
92
Miller, 538 U.S. at 334 (quoting Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S.
41, 50 (1987)).
93
Id. at 338.
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1. Specifically Directed Toward Insurance

For a law to be specifically directed toward insurance and
therefore satisfy the first prong of the savings clause test in Miller,
the law must regulate insurers “with respect to their insurance
practices.”94 This approach was a holdover from the Court’s
previous decision in FMC Corp. v. Holliday.95 FMC Corp. dealt
squarely with Pennsylvania’s antisubrogation statute and held that
the statute did “not merely have an impact on the insurance
industry; it [was] aimed at it.”96 The primary argument raised by
ERISA health insurers attempting to dislodge antisubrogation
statutes from savings clause protection following FMC Corp. and
Miller is overbreadth.97 In Miller, petitioners argued before the
Supreme Court that since the state law in question regulated health
maintenance organizations (“HMOs”) that were not insurers but
were only providing administrative services, the law could not be
classified as one specifically directed towards insurance.98 The
Supreme Court denied this contention and stated that even laws
with some degree of overbreadth resulting in their potential
application to noninsurers could still be saved from ERISA
preemption.99 Due to the precedent set by the Supreme Court’s
decisions in FMC Corp. and Miller, state antisubrogation laws
have subsequently been held to qualify as laws specifically

94

Id. at 334 (quoting Rush Prudential HMO, Inc. v. Moran, 536 U.S. 355,
366 (2002)).
95
FMC Corp. v. Holliday, 498 U.S. 52 (1990).
96
Id. at 61.
97
See Brief for Defendants-Appellees The Rawlings Co., Oxford Health
Plans (NY), Inc. and UnitedHealth Group Inc., Wurtz v. Rawlings Co., 761 F.3d
232 (2d Cir. 2014) (No. 13-1695-cv), 2013 WL 3964707, at *37 (“[New York’s
antisubrogation statute] contains a broad definition of what constitutes a ‘benefit
provider.’ . . . [which] hardly singles out insurance.”); Brief of Appellee, Singh
v. Prudential Health Care Plan, Inc., 335 F.3d 278 (4th Cir. 2003) (No. 011102), 2002 WL 32726921, at *26 (“While laws regulating subrogation rights
apply in part to holders of insurance, they do not regulate the insurance industry
directly.”).
98
Miller, 538 U.S. at 334.
99
Id. at 337–38.
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directed toward insurers, and therefore satisfy the first prong of the
Miller test.100
2. Risk Pooling
The fundamental idea of insurance and risk pooling is that a
large group of insureds will pay relatively small, predetermined
amounts (insurance premiums) which will in turn create a large
pool to fund health insurance payments in the event that one of the
insurance plan members has a catastrophic accident.101 Similar to
its treatment of the savings clause, Miller did not lay out a set of
discrete rules to guide lower courts in interpreting the risk-sharing
requirement.102 Instead, the Court described some of the elements
that factored into its decision to save the statute in Miller from
ERISA preemption.103 Most important among these factors was the
Court’s assertion that a saved state law need not actually spread
risk, but must “substantially affect the risk-pooling
arrangement.”104 One of the main arguments in favor of
subrogation acknowledges that subrogation (and by extension, the
negation of subrogation rights) affects the risk-pooling

100

See Wurtz v. Rawlings Co., 761 F.3d 232, 240 (2d Cir. 2014); Singh v.
Prudential Health Care Plan, Inc., 335 F.3d 278, 286 (4th Cir. 2003).
101
Beverly Cohen, Saving the Savings Clause: Advocating a Broader
Reading of the Miller Test to Enable States to Protect ERISA Health Plan
Members by Regulating Insurance, 18 GEO. MASON L. REV. 125, 144–45 (2010)
(“[R]isk pooling refers to the principle that risk averse individuals will often
prefer to take a small but certain loss [payment of premiums] in preference to a
large uncertain one [catastrophic illness]. Thus, insurance systems pool
economic risk, resulting in a small loss to many [in the form of insurance
premiums] rather than a large loss to the unfortunate few.” (alterations in
original) (quoting Standard Ins. Co. v. Morrison, 537 F. Supp. 2d 1142, 1150
(D. Mont. 2008))).
102
Miller, 538 U.S. at 341–42; Cohen, supra note 101 at 136 (“The Miller
Court’s explanation of what it means to ‘substantially affect the risk pooling
arrangement between the insurer and the insured’ was scant.”).
103
See, e.g., Cohen, supra note 101, at 136–37 (discussing four factors
illustrated by the Miller Court as useful in determining whether the state law at
question affects the risk-pooling arrangement).
104
Miller, 538 U.S. at 338–39 & n.3.
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arrangement.105 Proponents of subrogation frequently claim that
monies recovered through subrogation result in lower insurance
premiums for consumers.106 This can only occur because the end
result of subrogation is to place the risk of payment for medical
benefits on third-party tortfeasors or the injured victim.107
Express preemption of antisubrogation statutes, while still
subject to overbreadth arguments, is no longer a serious threat to
preempt insured ERISA health plans due to the reading of the
savings clause in FMC Corp. and Miller.108 However, ERISA’s
enforcement mechanism, found in § 502, has been held to have a
different type of preemptive power.
E. Complete Preemption Under ERISA § 502
ERISA’s second preemptive power is rooted in ERISA §
502(a)(1)(B). As mentioned above, § 502(a) provides a federal
right of enforcement for plan fiduciaries and beneficiaries seeking
“equitable relief.”109 However, this has also provided another
means of preempting state antisubrogation statutes called complete

105

See, e.g., Eric J. Pickar, Student Article, Westfield Insurance Company,
Inc. v. Rowe: The South Dakota Supreme Court Rejects the Common Law
“Made Whole” Doctrine on a Property Insurance Subrogation Claim, 47 S.D.
L. REV. 316, 324–25 (2002) (“[A]n essential notion of subrogation is that the
insured should be barred from obtaining . . . one recovery from the insurer under
the contractual provisions of the insurance policy, and a second recovery from
the tortfeasor under tort principles . . . . [T]his is the very principle most ardently
argued by insurance attorneys in defense of subrogation.”).
106
See, e.g., WICKERT, supra note 36, at 1-38 (“[S]ubrogation is a key
mechanism by which insurance premiums are kept in check and held to a
minimum.”).
107
See Brief Amici Curiae for the National Ass’n of Subrogation
Professionals and the Self Insurance Institute of America, Inc. in Support of
Petitioner, U.S. Airways, Inc. v. McCutchen, 133 S. Ct. 1537 (2013) (No. 111285), 2012 WL 3875233, at *25.
108
Defendants’ petition for a writ of certiorari to the Supreme Court in
Wurtz v. Rawlings does not contest the Second Circuit’s holding that New
York’s antisubrogation statute was saved from preemption. Petition for a Writ of
Certiorari, Rawlings Co. v. Wurtz, 135 S. Ct. 1400 (2015) (No. 14-487), 2014
WL 5475202, at *5.
109
29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(3) (2012).
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preemption.110 Complete preemption occurs where “Congress’
intent in enacting a statutory scheme is to supplant state law
completely.”111 In 1987, the Supreme Court established the
complete preemption doctrine of § 502(a)(1)(B), stating: “[t]he
policy choices reflected in the inclusion of certain remedies and the
exclusion of others under the federal scheme would be completely
undermined if ERISA-plan participants and beneficiaries were free
to obtain remedies under state law that Congress rejected in
ERISA.”112 In a companion decision on ERISA preemption handed
down the same day, the Supreme Court held that § 502(a)(1)(B)
was the exclusive remedy for any plan participant or fiduciary
seeking enforcement or clarification of rights under the plan.113
The effects of § 502 preemption are two-fold. First, the Supreme
Court has held that ERISA’s exclusive enforcement mechanism
provides a federal venue for any claims which could at some point
have been brought under § 502.114 This is primarily a jurisdictional
effect of complete preemption, which allows removal of state
actions to federal court if the claims can be characterized as
seeking “to enforce . . . rights under the terms of the plan” or “to
recover benefits due under the terms of the plan” as provided in §
502.115 This aspect of “complete preemption is a misnomer.”116

110

Aetna Health Inc. v. Davila, 542 U.S. 200, 209 (2004) (holding “any
state-law cause of action that duplicates, supplements, or supplants the ERISA
civil enforcement remedy [of § 502(a)(1)(B)] conflicts with the clear
congressional intent to make the ERISA remedy exclusive and is therefore
preempted.”).
111
Gary L. Wickert, 2nd Circuit Strips Fully-Insured Plans of Preemption
of New York Antisubrogation Law, MATHIESEN, WICKERT, & LEHRER, S.C.
(Aug. 27, 2014), http://www.mwl-law.com/2nd-circuit-strips-fully-insured-plans
-preemption-new-york-antisubrogation-law/.
112
Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41, 54 (1987).
113
Id. (“The deliberate care with which ERISA’s civil enforcement
remedies were drafted and the balancing of policies embodied in its choice of
remedies argue strongly for the conclusion that ERISA’s civil enforcement
remedies were intended to be exclusive.”).
114
Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Taylor, 481 U.S. 58, 63 (1987).
115
29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1)(B) (2012).
116
Lehmann v. Brown, 230 F.3d 916, 919 (7th Cir. 2000) (“‘[C]omplete
preemption’ is a misnomer, having nothing to do with preemption and
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Complete preemption in this context simply results in the recharacterization of any state law claims as claims for enforcement
of plan terms or benefits under § 502.117 However, once a claim
has fallen into the net of § 502 complete preemption, the
claimant’s remedies are limited to those permitted under ERISA,
which include “benefits due, a declaratory judgment on entitlement
to benefits, or an injunction against a plan administrator’s improper
refusal to pay benefits.”118 The logic behind ERISA’s complete
preemption is fundamentally simple: any claims which can be
brought under § 502 must be brought under § 502, and these claims
will be limited to § 502 remedies.119
In 2004, the Supreme Court laid out a new, two-pronged test
for complete preemption in Aetna Health Inc. v. Davila.120 The
first part of the test is whether an “individual, at some point in
time, could have brought his claim under ERISA §
502(a)(1)(B).”121 The second part of the test asks whether there is
any other “independent legal duty that is implicated by a
defendant’s actions.”122 Often, courts analyze plaintiffs’ claims and
will hold them to be completely preempted by ERISA if the claims
require the courts to interpret the terms of the plan.123 If plaintiffs’
claims do not hinge on any interpretation of the plans’ terms than
they are not claims that “could have been brought under ERISA §
502(a)(1)(B)” and do not satisfy the first prong of the Davila test.
If the defendant’s liability hinges on the existence and
everything to do with federal occupation of a field. The name misleads because,
when federal law occupies the field . . . every claim arises under federal law.”).
117
Id. at 919–20.
118
Dedeaux, 481 U.S. at 53.
119
Ingersoll-Rand Co. v. McClendon, 498 U.S. 133, 144 (1990) (“Congress
intended § 502(a) to be the exclusive remedy for rights guaranteed under
ERISA . . . .”).
120
Aetna Health Inc. v. Davila, 542 U.S. 200 (2004).
121
Id. at 210.
122
Id.
123
See Moran v. Rush Prudential HMO, Inc., 230 F.3d 959, 967 (7th Cir.
2000) (identifying factors to consider when determining whether to
recharacterize a state law claim as an ERISA claim, which includes “whether the
plaintiff’s state law claim cannot be resolved without an interpretation of the
contract” (quoting Jass v. Prudential Health Care Plan, Inc., 88 F.3d 1482, 1487
(7th Cir. 1996))).
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administration of an ERISA plan, then the claim does not implicate
an independent legal duty but is dependent on the plan and its
terms.124
II. THE TANGLED WEB OF ERISA PREEMPTION—CIRCUIT SPLITS
BEFORE AND AFTER WURTZ
A. Antisubrogation Statutes Preempted
In three separate decisions, the Third, Fourth, and Fifth Circuits
found state antisubrogation statutes to be completely preempted
under ERISA § 502. The Fifth Circuit dealt directly with ERISA’s
complete preemption of a Louisiana antisubrogation law in Arana
v. Ochsner.125 Arana was injured in a car accident and was covered
under his mother’s employer-sponsored ERISA health plan, which
paid approximately $180,000 in medical benefits as a result of
Arana’s injuries.126 After Arana obtained settlements against the
tortfeasor, Ochsner Health Plan (“OHP”) claimed a right of
reimbursement in the amount of $180,000 in medical benefits out
of Arana’s settlement proceeds.127 Arana filed suit in Louisiana
state court, relying on Louisiana Insurance Code § 22.663, which
prohibited subrogation claims.128 OHP removed the case to the
Eastern District of Louisiana on the grounds that Arana’s claims
were really claims “to recover benefits” under § 502 and were
therefore completely preempted by ERISA.129
On appeal, the Fifth Circuit held that Arana’s claims, based on
Louisiana’s antisubrogation statute, were nonetheless claims to
recover benefits under his ERISA plan.130 In reaching this

124

See Davila, 542 U.S. at 213 (“[I]nterpretation of the terms of
respondents’ benefit plans forms an essential part of their [state law] claim,
and . . . liability would exist here only because of petitioners’ administration of
ERISA-regulated benefit plans.”).
125
Arana v. Ochsner Health Plan, 338 F.3d 433 (5th Cir. 2003).
126
Id. at 435.
127
Id.
128
Id. at 435–36.
129
Id. at 436.
130
Id. at 438.

154

JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY

conclusion, the Fifth Circuit relied on a tenuous legal fiction,
stating:
Arana’s benefits are under something of a cloud, for
OHP is asserting a right to be reimbursed for the
benefits it has paid for his account. It could be said,
then, that although the benefits have already been
paid, Arana has not fully ‘recovered’ them . . . free
and clear of OHP’s claims.131
The Court further stated that “one could say that Arana seeks to
enforce his rights under the terms of the plan, for he seeks to
determine his entitlement to retain . . . benefits.”132 Arana argued
that complete preemption alone under ERISA was not enough to
establish federal jurisdiction but rather that both express and
complete preemption were required.133 The Fifth Circuit, however,
expressly departed from its own prior holdings, which had required
both complete preemption under § 502 and express preemption
(referred to in the decision as conflict preemption) under § 514 and
held instead that complete preemption alone was enough to justify
federal jurisdiction.134
Seven days prior to the Fifth Circuit’s decision in Arana, the
Fourth Circuit addressed a similar set of issues in Singh v.
Prudential Health Care Plan, Inc.135 Sabriyana Singh recovered a
settlement from a third-party tortfeasor for injuries sustained in a
car accident and Prudential sought reimbursement of funds paid for
Singh’s medical treatment.136 Singh paid the reimbursement claim
and afterwards filed suit in Maryland state court under the theory
that the Maryland HMO Act, which the Maryland Court of
Appeals stated prohibited HMOs from “pursuing . . . subrogation
after [its] members have received damages from a third-party
tortfeasor,” barred Prudential’s reimbursement claim.137 The
Fourth Circuit ultimately held that Singh’s claims were “saved”
131

Id.
Id.
133
Id. at 439.
134
Id. at 440.
135
Singh v. Prudential Health Care Plan, Inc., 335 F.3d 278 (4th Cir. 2003).
136
Id. at 281.
137
Id. (quoting Riemer v. Columbia Med. Plan, Inc., 747 A.2d 667, 697
(Md. 2000)) (alteration in original).
132
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from express preemption by § 514’s savings clause but were
nonetheless completely preempted under § 502.138 The court’s
express preemption holding correctly relied on the Supreme
Court’s decision in FMC Corp. that state antisubrogation statutes
as applied to fully insured plans are laws that regulate insurance
and are saved from preemption.139 The Singh decision, however,
erred when addressing § 502’s complete preemption of Singh’s
claims. The Fourth Circuit held that Singh sought entitlement to
“undiminished benefits” under her plan and therefore was actually
stating a claim for benefits that must be brought under § 502.140
The Fourth Circuit’s characterization of actions founded on
antisubrogation statutes relies on the same legal fiction as the Fifth
Circuit’s decision in Arana. The Fourth and Fifth Circuit decisions
ignore the fact that in both cases the health benefits due to the
injured plaintiffs had already been paid as required under the terms
of the plans.141 It is a mischaracterization to describe the plaintiffs’
claims in Arana and Singh as claims for benefits due when the
benefits had already been received. The Fifth Circuit’s holding that
Arana’s benefits remained under “something of a cloud”142 is sheer
fiction; Arana had already received his benefits.143 It is unclear
how benefits that had already been fully paid and administered
could remain under something of a cloud, especially when Arana
had no obligation to pursue the tortfeasor in the third-party action.
Similarly, the Fourth Circuit’s insertion of the critical, but
misplaced modifier, “undiminished benefits,” illustrates the court’s
rejection of the factual circumstances in that case: Singh had
already received all the benefits due to her under the terms of her
plan. Singh’s plan benefits were not diminished, her tort settlement
was.144
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The Third Circuit’s decision in Levine v. United Healthcare
Corp. relies heavily on the decisions in Arana and Singh.145 Levine
involved three separate plaintiffs who were injured in three
separate events but were all covered under health insurance plans
provided by United Healthcare Corporation and Horizon Blue
Cross and Blue Shield of New Jersey.146 All three claimants
negotiated settlements with the respective tortfeasors, and all three
claimants were targeted by their health insurer through
reimbursement claims.147 After the three plaintiffs in Levine
satisfied the reimbursement claims, the New Jersey Supreme Court
announced that New Jersey’s antisubrogation statute overruled a
New Jersey Department of Insurance regulation that had permitted
subrogation and reimbursement clauses.148 The plaintiffs in Levine
filed their claims in New Jersey state court relying on the
antisubrogation statute to recover the amounts they had paid to
satisfy the reimbursement claims.149 The Third Circuit held that the
plaintiffs’ claims in Levine were claims for benefits due under the
terms of their plans and therefore completely preempted under
ERISA § 502(a).150 The Third Circuit stated that the “[plaintiffs]
claim essentially that they are entitled to have certain health
insurance claims paid under their ERISA plans. It is impossible to
determine the merits of the Insureds’ claims without delving into
the provisions of their . . . plans.”151 Here again, the Third Circuit
constructed a fiction as a means of tying the plaintiffs’ claims to
the terms of their plans despite the fact that the benefits had
already been satisfactorily administered.
These three decisions all overlook a critical factor that reveals
the dichotomy between actions to enforce plan provisions and
actions based in antisubrogation statutes. Tort claims involve far
more damage elements than merely medical expenses152—
elements such as pain and suffering, mental and emotional
145
146
147
148
149
150
151
152
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anguish, loss of services, and loss of future earnings.153 Therefore,
reimbursement out of this settlement fund does not actually
involve a strict, traceable reimbursement for medical benefits, but
rather depletes funds intended to compensate the insured for other
claims arising from their injury. This is especially true in cases
involving catastrophic, life changing injuries as the third-party
tortfeasor’s insurance policy is unlikely to cover for the true extent
of the damages.154 Great-West Life Ins. Co. v. Knudson, another
subrogation case before the Supreme Court, dealt with claims
against Janette Knudson, a women who was rendered a
quadriplegic after a car accident and settled her action against the
tortfeasor for $650,000.155 The original distribution of the
settlement funds, after payment of attorneys’ fees and other liens,
left Janette Knudson with $256,745.30 for the establishment of a
special needs trust.156 Great-West nonetheless asserted a right to be
reimbursed $411,157.11 for medical payments made for
Knudson’s treatment.157 Once again, this illustrates the false
connection that has been created between benefits due under the
plan158 and tort-settlement funds. Knudson had already recovered
her benefits and the money paid in settlement for her tort action
represented compensation for the pain, suffering, and loss of
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earnings that she would have to endure for the rest of her life.159
Indeed, this distinction formed one of the common law’s primary
justifications for disallowing subrogation in the personal injury
context: “the loss-victim’s deal with the insurer for compensation
was a deal entirely separate from the loss-victim’s right to recover
from the tortfeasor.”160 Recognition of this distinction establishes
that any action by an insured to keep or regain funds acquired as a
result of a tort settlement cannot be construed as an action to
recover benefits due under the terms of the plan and therefore
should not be subjected to complete preemption under ERISA.
B. Untangling the Web—Wurtz v. Rawlings
The facts at issue in Wurtz v. Rawlings mirrored those seen in
the Third, Fourth, and Fifth Circuit cases analyzed above. The
plaintiffs in Wurtz sued and recovered settlements for separate
personal injury actions against third-party tortfeasors.161 The
plaintiffs were covered by ERISA health benefit plans that had
paid for medical treatment.162 The plaintiffs had already paid their
ERISA insurers the claimed reimbursement sums.163 Afterwards,
the “plaintiffs sought a declaration that . . . defendants did not have
a right to seek reimbursement or subrogation of medical benefits
against plaintiffs’ tort settlements” and “sought damages for unjust
enrichment and deceptive business practices.”164 The Eastern
District of New York held that the plaintiffs’ claims were both
expressly and completely preempted by ERISA.165 Specifically,
the plaintiffs’ claims in Wurtz were based on N.Y. Gen. Oblig.
Law § 5-335 which, at the time of the District Court’s ruling,
stated:
(a) When a plaintiff settles with one or more
defendants in an action for personal injuries . . . it
159
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shall be conclusively presumed that the settlement
does not include any compensation for the cost of
health care services, loss of earnings or other
economic loss to the extent those losses or expenses
have been or are obligated to be paid or reimbursed
by a benefit provider, except for those payments as
to which there is a statutory right of
reimbursement . . . no party entering into such a
settlement shall be subject to a subrogation claim or
claim for reimbursement by a benefit provider and a
benefit provider shall have no lien or right of
subrogation or reimbursement against any such
settling party, with respect to those losses or
expenses that have been or are obligated to be paid
or reimbursed by said benefit provider.166
The District Court held that, despite the statutory language of N.Y.
Gen. Oblig. Law § 5-335, the claims were expressly preempted as
they did not regulate insurance as required by ERISA’s savings
clause.167 Specifically, the District Court found that because the
statute referenced benefit providers it was overly broad and did not
qualify as a law that regulates insurance to be saved from express
preemption under § 514’s savings clause.168 The District Court also
found the plaintiffs’ claims to be completely preempted under
ERISA § 502(a)(1)(B) because the plaintiffs’ request for a
declaratory judgment holding the defendants’ liens to be invalid
under N.Y. Gen. Oblig. Law § 5-335 was, in reality, a claim for
benefits and therefore plaintiffs’ claims could only be brought
under ERISA § 502(a)(1)(B).169
In response to the portion of the ruling holding that the savings
clause did not apply because the statute was overly broad, the New
York State Legislature amended N.Y. Gen. Oblig. Law § 5-335.170
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Specifically, the legislature removed the term benefit provider
from the statute and replaced it with the term insurer.171 The
amended statute’s statement of legislative intent made clear the
legislature’s disapproval of the lower court’s ruling in Wurtz.172
The legislature went on to state, in very clear terms, that the
purpose of the amendment was to:
ensure that insurers will not be able to claim or
access any monies paid in settlement of a tort
claim . . . so that the burden of payment for health
care services, disability payments, lost wage
payments or any other benefits for the victims of
torts will be borne by the insurer and not any party
to a settlement of such a victim’s tort claim.173
This purports to eliminate ERISA plan insurers’ rights of
subrogation. The amended statute was made retroactively
applicable.174 The plaintiffs in Wurtz appealed the District Court’s
judgment and the amended statute was passed in time for the
Second Circuit’s consideration of their appeal.175
The Second Circuit vacated the Eastern District of New York’s
ruling and remanded the case.176 The decision limited the scope of
ERISA preemption and upheld New York’s antisubrogation
statute.177 In so doing, the court applied the same tests for express
and complete preemption as those used by the District Court but
arrived at completely opposite conclusions on every question
presented.178 The Supreme Court denied a petition for a writ of
certiorari filed on behalf of the health insurers in Wurtz, thereby
cementing the Second Circuit’s decision.179
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In deciding the express preemption issue, the Second Circuit
pointed out that even under the prior statutory language
(containing the term “benefit provider” instead of “insurer”), the
statute satisfied the first prong and was specifically directed
towards insurance entities.180 In deciding this, the Second Circuit
stated that a law impacting benefit providers was not per se
invalid.181 Rather, the critical factor is whether the statute “does
not merely have an impact on the insurance industry; [but] is
aimed at it.”182 The court held that even absent the more specific
language in the statute as amended, the law was still sufficiently
directed towards insurance companies to qualify for ERISA
preemption under the first prong.183
The Second Circuit found the New York statute also satisfied
the second prong in that it “substantially affect[ed] risk pooling
between insurers and insureds.”184 In language mimicking the
statute’s statement of legislative intent, the court stated: “Section
5-335 requires that insurers bear the risk of medical expenses
whether or not the insured settles or goes to trial, and it thus
substantially affects risk pooling between insurers and insureds.”185
This set a much lower bar than the District Court, which held this
prong could only be satisfied if the state law affected the insurance
market as a whole, not simply the small subset of ERISA insureds
that attain settlements after personal injury events.186
In analyzing the complete preemption issue, the Second Circuit
characterized the plaintiffs’ claims in a manner completely
different from that of the District Court. The Circuit Court held
that N.Y. Gen. Oblig. Law § 5-335 was not completely preempted
under § 502(a)(1)(B) because the plaintiffs were not seeking to
enforce their rights under the plan.187 Instead, according to the
Court, the plaintiffs relied on New York’s antisubrogation statute
180
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to enforce a “state right . . . to be free from subrogation.”188 This
reasoning meant that the plaintiffs’ claims were not those of the
type to normally be brought under § 502(a)(1)(B) and were
therefore not completely preempted under the first prong of the
Davila test.189 Furthermore, the Second Circuit found that the
plaintiffs’ claims implicated an independent legal duty and
therefore were not preempted under the second prong of the Davila
test,
because
the
New
York
statute
“prohibit[ed] . . . subrogation . . . [p]laintiffs’ claims do not derive
from their plans or require investigation into the terms of their
plans; rather they derive from N.Y. Gen. Oblig. Law § 5-335.”190
The plaintiffs’ claims were grounded in the state right provided by
the antisubrogation statute and therefore “the terms of plaintiffs’
ERISA plans are irrelevant to their claims.”191
C. Subrogation after Wurtz
The Supreme Court’s denial of certiorari in Wurtz means
insurers of fully-insured ERISA plans will no longer be able to
enforce subrogation or rights of reimbursement against the
personal injury settlements of their insureds in New York.192 This
avoids replicating the unjust and untenable situation that occurred
as a result of an enforceable subrogation clause involving New
Jersey resident Justin Rose,193 a nine year old infant who suffered
second and third degree burns to over 77% of his body.194 Rose
was a dependent to an ERISA plan which paid for $1.2 million
188
189
190
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191
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dollars in necessary medical treatment for Rose’s injuries.195
Ultimately, Rose’s personal injury case against the tortfeasor
resulted in a $600,000 settlement.196 The health insurer brought
suit in the United States District Court of New Jersey to enforce its
subrogation clause, demanding that the entirety of Rose’s
settlement be paid to the health insurer as reimbursement for
payment of his medical expenses.197 The court strictly enforced the
health insurer’s subrogation clause with the result that Rose and his
family were forced to surrender the entire settlement to his health
insurer.198 The decision in Wurtz, if adopted by other Circuit
Courts, can ultimately signal an end, or at least a diminishing, of
insurance companies’ ability to enforce subrogation clauses
without limitation from state regulation.
The Second Circuit expressly acknowledged that its decision in
Wurtz constituted a circuit split with the Third, Fourth, and Fifth
Circuits.199 The critical question raised in the petition for certiorari
in Wurtz and by the Second Circuit’s decision, as well as in
opposing decisions in the Third, Fourth, and Fifth Circuits, was
whether a state law “saved” from express preemption by § 514’s
savings clause can nevertheless still be completely preempted
under § 502. This is an untenable result which would render the
savings clause moot. It is unlikely that Congress intended to “save”
certain state laws from preemption only to preempt them again in
another clause.200A review of the conflicting holdings
demonstrates the soundness of the Second Circuit’s decision in
Wurtz and the problems with the approaches taken by the Third,
Fourth and Fifth Circuits.
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III. POLICY IMPLICATIONS
There are two primary policy justifications advanced by
proponents of subrogation.201 The first is that subrogation
recoveries result in increased revenues for insurance companies
that are then passed down to consumers in the form of lower
premiums.202 The second justification is that subrogation prevents
a “double recovery” on the part of the insured.203 This theory is
based on the notion that an insured should not be permitted to
recover for the same incident twice, i.e. medical benefits arising
out of the ERISA plan and settlement funds from a tort action.204
Neither of these justifications are sound.
A. Lower Premiums
Proponents of subrogation claim that the practice “serves the
laudable goal[] of . . . keeping insurance rates down.”205 This claim
has been questioned by various commentators and found
unpersuasive by a number of courts. The very nature of
subrogation in the personal injury context calls this claim into
question. Recoveries out of subrogation claims are highly
unpredictable whereas insured losses must be covered by the
insurance policy regardless of the context in which it was
201
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sustained.206 If an insured is struck by lightning, the insurer must
cover those medical expenses under the terms of the plan to the
same extent that it covers an insured who is injured in a car
accident. Any subrogation recovery depends on a number of
unpredictable factors such as the provable liability of the
tortfeasor, the tortfeasor’s insurance policy, and the willingness of
the insured to pursue the case.207 Even if all these factors line up
favorably, extended litigation in the tort action can delay a
settlement for years. Instead, insurance rates are based on
“actuarial estimates . . . [t]hey are not usually computed with any
possible recovery from third-party sources in mind because the
mathematical probability of such a recovery is difficult to
determine.”208 Statistics bear this out: “over the past 20 years
health benefit costs . . . have increased by an average of 7.2 percent
annually and premium increases have averaged 7.1 percent
annually.”209 Insurance premiums are determined on the basis of
losses and do not take subrogation recoveries into account.210
B. Double Recovery
The double recovery justification of subrogation posits that “to
permit the insured to receive[] payment from both the wrongdoer
and the insurer would be to give him double compensation for his
loss.”211 However, a tort settlement compensates the injured victim
for losses that are unconnected to the payment of past medical
benefits. These tort settlements are often limited to the extent of
the tortfeasor’s insurance coverage and do not compensate the
victim to the full extent of his or her injuries.212 Since subrogation
attempts to recover money paid out for medical benefits, the
206
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largest subrogation claims will often be made against insureds with
grievous injuries. The ultimate effect of strictly enforcing these
subrogation claims under the framework of ERISA will be to leave
some victims destitute.213 This directly conflicts with the laudable
goals Congress had in mind when enacting the statute.
CONCLUSION
The rise of subrogation against injured victims covered by
employee health plans was not a result that was intended or
expected by the drafters of ERISA,214 and the harsh effects of
subrogation are not felt by the majority of those covered by ERISA
plans. However, for the few unfortunate enough to become
acquainted with the subrogation clauses in their plans after
suffering a devastating injury, the effects are profound.
Subrogation under ERISA must be limited. This is best
accomplished by allowing state legislatures to make their own
decisions on subrogation. This may result in some states deciding
to limit or ban subrogation altogether. Regardless of any state’s
particular decision, however, simply upholding existing state
antisubrogation laws in the face of preemptive challenges would
help to address the “regulatory vacuum” which currently exists
under ERISA.215 The framework for accomplishing this has
already been provided by the Second Circuit’s decision in Wurtz.
The savings clause was intended to allow states to regulate
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insurance.216 When an insured invokes an antisubrogation statute
as a means to keep funds attained through a tort settlement, no
amount of crafty legal wording should succeed in turning that into
an action for benefits due under the plan. It is time to allow
insureds all the rights given to them by their own state legislatures
and put an end to the practice of using injured victims as collection
agents for insurance companies.217
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